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In the aftermath or World War JI, the internation<l  community 
set about to revise the Gen eva Conventior1s. Three of the foL;r 
treaties that emerged from this effort, all of which held been 
adopted to mitigate the SLLffering of v·icti ms of war, were in force 
chtring lhc War. f lowever, it WCIS the failure of the lC1W lo fully 
accomplish their humc:�nitadan purpose that animC!tcd the revision 
efforts. These efforts cuI rn.inated in 1949 with fom treaties 
addressi r1g the plight of four particular groups of war victims, 
treaties which have since earned the distinction of being the only 
interncttional agreements to be universally ratified. 
The substantive advances in the Law of Armed Conflict 
(" LOAC') contained in these Lreaties ref1ecl these. Of the mAny 
lessons learned in the (/battle laboratory'' of World Warn, perhaps 
most profound was that even Lhe most comprehensive treaty 
regime is m.eaningless w1less it is applied and respected by the 
parties loa conflict. Prior to 'vVor!d War II, it was simply assumed 
that the law este1blished to regulate war would apply to war. 
However, the limits of this assumption were exposed during both 
World War lJ and the civil wars that occur ed the inter-war years . 
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Although these events satisfied any pragrnatic definition of" war,'' 
the absence of a de facto standard for determining when lhe law of 
war (a term that is today synonymous 'v\'ith humanitarian law or 
the law of armed conflict) became obligatory, wets exploited by 
states whe.n they used what can only be described as crcalivt: 
interpretations to disavov\' the corttlicl they were engaged in WC1S J 
war as that term v.·as defined bv international law. 
,· 
fn response1 the drafters of lhc Conycntions included the first 
ever lTeaty " triggering'' provisions. Their purpose was to create �1 
truly de facto standard for detennining wheJ1 lhe law would apply 
to protect the victims of war. As a result, the foca] point for 
determining applicab ility -vvould no longer be "war"- a krn1. 
susceptible to interpretive avoidance- but instet1d h arrned 
conflict." Accordingly, the second article common to the four 
treaties ("Common Article 2'') re<-tu ired application of the full 
corpus of the treaties to any international- or inter-state- armed 
conflict. And, in response to the reality that even in a purely intra­
state con.text armed hostilities between competing armed entities 
could becorne sufficiently intense as to amount to de facto armed 
conflict, all four treaties also included an article requiring the 
humane treatment of any person not participating in hostilities 
during non-internaUonal arn1ed con flicts within the territory of a 
state (intra-state armed conflict) : Comn1on Article 3. Although 
neither of these treaty provif;ions explicitly indicated that lheir 
effect was to trigger not only the treaty provisions contained in lhe 
Conventions but all other provisions of the LOAC, they rapidly 
evolved to have such effect. 
From 1949 to 2001, this law triggering paradigm became a 
genuine article of faith. Military lawyersj government and. non­
government experts, academics, and judges cClllcd upon to apply 
the law of armed conflict relied on lhis Common Article 2/3 
"either/ or" armed conflict dicho tomy c\S the definitive standard for 
determining situations requiring app lication oi LOAC obligations 
and authorities. HovveveJ, during this same period, and 
particularly following the end of the Cold Wac cmned forces of 
many nations found themselves en�aged in operations that fell 
somewhere in the twilight zone between ''"'1r and peace when 
executing the ubiquitous "peace keeping'' mission. These forces 
were instructed by their legal advisors that such operations were 
not technically regulated by the LOAC because they failed to fall 
within the Cmnmon Artic.le 2/3 paradigm. Nonetheless, as a 
matter of national (and sometimes multi-natjonal) poUcy, LOAC 
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principles vvere invoked to provide an effective and consistent 
operational regulatory frame·work. 
Peacekeeping operations were, hovvever, defined in large 
measure bv the absence of hostilities. Even when they involved 
J -
small scale hostilities, like U.S. operations in Somalia in 1992, the 
general nature of the missions coupled with the application of 
LOAC principles as a matter of national policy obviated any need 
to critique the inherent limitations of the Common Article 2/3 law­
triggering paradign1. As " result, little attention -vvas pClid to the 
question of whether the Common Article 2/3 standard was 
sufficiently comprehensive to C\ddress the realities of a rapidly 
changing military operatiom1l environment. The events of 
September 11, or more precisely the U.S. response to those events, 
-.vould render this critique unavoidable. 
lmmediatelv after these infamous strikes on the U.S. homeland, 
J 
President Bush made clear that the United States considered itself 
the victim of an arn1ed attack and that the struggle against AI 
Qaeda was an "armed conflict." This language was not mere 
hyperbole. Instead, it represented a clear demarcation for a "new" 
approach to the slruggle against international Lerrorism. For the 
first time since the inception of the Geneva Convention's Common 
Article 2/3 triggering paradigm, a state asserted that it was 
engaged in an armed conflict of international scope with a non­
state entity. No longer would this struggle be characterized as an 
exercise of international law enforcement. Instead, the United 
States would use the instruments and authority of armed conflict 
to bring this non-state enemy to submission. While this armed 
conflict characterization was rejected by some as invalid, in the 
months and years following the attacks of September 11 all tluee 
branches of the U.S. government would endorse the decision by 
President Bush to define the struggle within this law of armed 
conflict legal framework. 
Designating the struggle against a transnational non-state 
opponent as an C\rmed conflict seemed, at least at the military 
operational level, logicaL US armed forces were directed to seek 
out and engage Al Qaeda operatives with combat power, and to 
detain captured i\1 Quedu personnel to prevent them from 
returning to the "global fight." However, a legal incongruity was 
almost inm1ediately exposed: while the United States had invoked 
the most fundamental authority associated with armed conflict­
the authority derived from the principle of military necessity 
(which included the authority to employ deadly combat power as a 
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n1easure of first resort)- the transnationa I scope of the non-state 
enetDy excluded the conflict from the Common Article 2/3 
"either/ or" paradigm. According to the President, because Al 
Qaeda was not a state, the armed conflict did not trigger the full 
corpus of the law pursuant to Con1n1on Article 2; and because the 
conflict was not "internal/' it did not trigger even the m.inirT1um 
humane treatment obligation of Common Article 3. 
This incongruity would be fully exposed by the status Clnd 
treatment standards adopted for captured AI Qaeda operatives. In 
his February 7, 2002 finding, President Bush explicitly disavowed 
any United States obligation to comply with the law of arm.ed 
conflict vis a vis these detainees. The United States was not even 
bound by the minimum humane treatment obligation of Common 
f\rticle 3 because of the transnational scope of the armed conflict. 
This incongruity was further exposed by President Bush when 
he ordered the trial and capture of AI QC�eda operatives before a 
military commission for violations of the laws and customs of WC\f. 
This invocation of the LOAC as a source of authority to condemn 
the conduct of captured Al Qaeda operatives �:vould lead to Salim 
Hamdan's challenge of the legality of his trial by military 
commission. This challenge would ultimately reach the Supreme 
Court, where Hamdan asserted that the procedures for his military 
commission violated the Common Article 3's humane treatment 
mandate. In response, the Supreme Court interpreted Common 
Article 3 to apply in "contradistinction" to Common Article 2. In 
so doing, the Court effectively rejected the President's selective 
invocation of the law by holding that any armed conflict not 
regulated by Common Article 2 was ipso facto regulated by 
Connnon Article 3. However, it was also clear that the Court also 
endorsed the armed conflict characterization of the struggle against 
tra nsna tiona 1 terra rism. 
Almost immediately following this landmark decision, Israel 
launched a major combat operation into Lebanon against 
Hezbollah forces. Neither Israel nor Lebanon asserted that they 
were engaged in an inter-state armed conflict. Instead, Israel and 
the non-state entity Hezbollah engaged in intense hostilities, 
aln10st all of which occurred outside Israeli territory. The 
confluence of these two events generated a subtle but profound 
reassessment of the Common Article 2/3 law-triggering standard. 
The longstanding assumption thClt the inter-state v. intra-state 
paradigm provided the exclusive trigger for LOAC application 
seemed increasingly invalid. Both the United States and Israel 
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engaged in hostilities against non-state transnational enemies, 
employing force in a manner that certainly indicated the existence 
of de facto armed conflict. For the Supreme Court, this assertion of 
authority for purposes of trying a captured opponent with an 
accordant rejection of obligation derived from the same law 
resulted in an interpretation of Common Article 3's scope arguably 
inconsistent ·with the accepted understanding of the treaty. A 
similar reaction followed fsr<.1el's use of combat power in Lebanon: 
govermnent ar1d non-governmental critics of both Israeli and 
Hezbollah tactics consistently invoked LOAC principles to support 
their positions. The world had witnessed once again the inevitable 
reality of war: the unleashing of combat power to disable or 
destroy a designated enemy. And, international reactiort to these 
operations quite logically dem�anded compliance with "rules" to 
regulate the application of such power, protect innocent victims of 
the hostilities, and to ensure the humane treatment of captured 
opponents. Like the Supreme Court, the existence of de facto 
hostilities and the invocation of armed conflict authority by the 
state seemed to override the inherent limitations of the Comn1on 
Article 2/3 law-triggering paradigm; which proved no impediment 
to the assertion that both Israel and Hezbollah were bound to 
comply with the law of war. 
By the summer of 2006, a realization appeared to be emerging 
in the international community: LOAC regulation is essential 
during nll armed conflicts. While this might seem axiomatic, from 
a legal perspective it was anything but. Because the armed conflict 
characterization of the struggle against transnational non-state 
entities did not ''fit" within the Common Article 2/3 law-triggering 
paradigm, it was met with widespread criticism. But this criticism 
failed to recognize what was exposed first by the Guantanamo 
experience and subsequently by Israeli operations in Lebanon: 
armed conflict is defined by operational reality, not by whether a 
given operation "fits" within the Common Article 2/3 paradigm .. 
It was becoming apparent that irrespective of the inter-state v. 
intra-state limiting interpretation of the law, states were using 
military power in a manner that appeared to create the risks 
historicc:tlly associated with armed conflict. As a rP.sult, thf' s;:mlE' 
critics who challenged the legitimacy of the U.S. invocation of 
LOAC authority were increasingly demanding compliance -vvith 
LOAC collstrnints, implicitly acknowledging the applicability of the 
LOAC outside the inter-state v. intra-state law trio-o-erino-oo 0 
paradigm. 
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The ultirnate irony in this law applicability deb21te is thC'It the 
intent of the 1949 Conventions b<id been flipped on its proverbial 
head. Of all the LOAC advancements contained in those tour 
treaties, the most profound was the express rejection of creative 
law avoidance. The purpose ot the ''armed conflict" law triggt:'r 
was to ensure that ITumanitarian protections came into force ba�t:>d 
n.ol on legalistic definitions and interpretations of the term. "w<n," 
but instead on <1 truly de facto criterion. That criterion was armed 
conflict, which denoted Fl situation of armed hostilities justifying 
the imposition of international legal constrCiints on the participants. 
Once hostilities existed, the humtlnitari::m interests of victims 
required a lnw-trigg..:ring st<mdard that prevenled states from 
disavowing constraints <:�nd obligations ill the core of humanitarian 
law. Even in the rec:dm of intra-state armed conflict, which up until 
19L19 had been regarded as immune frorn international regulation, 
both state and non-state <1ctors would be compelled to respect the 
n1ost basic lim.italion.s on their conduct tlwough the requirement to 
ensure the humane treatment of all those actively engaged in 
hostilities. 
However, because the drafters of the Geneva Conventions 
focused on the two types o£ conilict prevalent between World War 
1 and 1949, nc1rneLy inter-state and intra-state conflict; tbe law 
triggers they adopted became synonymous with only these types 
of am1ed conflict. Thus, in the aftermath of September 11., this 
inter-state v. inh·a-state paradjgm was reLied upon to assert that the 
law did not apply to transnational non-state actors, even though 
the United States was invoking the authority of war to disable this 
enemy. This "authority without obligation" interpretation of the 
treaties was thus deriv�d from a credible interpretation of 
Common Articles 2 and 3, but it defied the underlying spirit of 
these provisions. lt also distorted the purpose of the law itself, 
which has alwavs been to strike an efficient balance between lhe 
authority of military necessity <md tl1c constraints of tl1e dictates of 
humanity. 
Rejection of this selective invocation of authority \!Vithout 
obligation was central to the Supreme Court's "contradistinction" 
interpretation of Common Article 3. But this was jusl the lip of the 
proverbial iceberg. Designating the struggle against transnationC\i 
terrorism as an armed conflict has necessitated a re-evaluation of 
the entire law triggering paradigm. The Court's interpretation of 
Common Article 3 was effective to ensure the humane treatment of 
detainees-the isbue the Supreme Court confronted in Hamdan-
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but Cornm.on Article 3 provides no regulation for the application of 
combat power. As a result, the Hn111dan decision did not address 
the broader question of what rules regulate hostilities between 
state and transnational non-state cntitiE�S. The Israel and Hezbollah 
conflict confirmed this by exposing the world to the reality that 
conflict regulation becornes essential when the first salvo is fired, 
and not just when opponents arc detained. 
This process of reconsideration has stirred vigorous debate in 
the circles of LOAC expertise. Many scholars reject the assertion. 
that the LOAC applies outside the intE�r-state v. intra-·state context, 
arguing tl1at operations conducted against transnational terrorists 
are properly categorized within the law enforcement Jegai 
framework. However, this Ztpproach is increasingly rejected by 
experts within the milit<1ries responsible for executing these 
operations. This divide is particularly instructive, for it reveals an 
underlying defect in the rejection of the transnational armed 
conflict trigger for applicability of the LOAC regulatory 
framework: the failure to recognize that the ultimate purpose of 
Common Articles 2 and 3. 
The great innovation of these treaty provisions was the 
recognition that armed conflict must dictate applicability of law, 
and this applicability must be based on a truly de facto assessment 
of the existence of armed conflict. Neither the nature of the enemy, 
nor the geographic scope of operations against that enemy should 
be dispositive in determining the existence of armed conflict. What 
is emerging in response to the reality of "transnational" anned 
conflict is an understanding that any armed conflict triggers a 
customary regulatory framework composed of foundational LOAC 
principles. These principles are esserttial not only to ensure the 
humane treatment of captured and deitained enemy personnel, but 
also to effectively regulate the application of combat power. As a 
result, in addition to the humane treatment mandate derived from 
Common Article 3, they include: 1) the principles of military 
necessity (which itself refiects an inherent balance between power 
and restraint by authorizing only those m.easures that are not 
otherwise forbidden by international .lavv); 2) distinction (limiting 
attacks to only lt1wful militt1ry objectives); 3) proportionality 
(imposing an obligation to balance ithe advantage of an attack 
against the anticipated but non-purposeful infliction of harm to 
innocents); and 4) a prohibition against inDiction of unnecessary 
suffering (prohibiting the infliction of superfluous injury or 
suffering to lawful objects of attack). These four principles provide 
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the foundation for the regulation of all hostilities, and failure to 
acknowledge their applicability to any armed is inconsistent not 
only with the common sense expectations of the international 
community, but more importantly with the interests of the armed 
forces required to engage in such operations. 
This re-assessment of the situations that trigger LOAC 
applicability is perhaps the most significant development in this 
area of international law since the International Crimi.nal Tribunal 
for the Former Yugoslavia ("ICTY") begcm to inject LOAC 
regulation into the realm� of internc1l anned conflict. Both of these 
developments share a common connection: the recognition that 
effective regulation of hostilities cannot be nullified by an inflexible 
approach to treaty application. just as the ICTY determined that 
essential regulatory principles evoived fron1 treaties applicable 
only to inter-state armed conflict had "migrated" to the realm of 
intra-state armed conflict, there is an analogous recognition 
emerging that these principles must also "migrate" to the realm of 
transnational armed conflicts. While opposition to this proposition 
is undoubtedly inevitable, the increasing reliance on this expanded 
conception of LOAC applicability by anTted forces suggests that 
this opposition is not based on a genuine appreciation of the 
underlying logic and purpose of the LOAC, but instead on the type 
of inflexible adherence to treaty interpretation that the ICTY 
concluded was inconsistent with the purpose of the law. 
Acknowledging the need to ensure transnational armed 
conflicts are subject to LOAC regulation does not, however, resolve 
the even more difficult question of how to define these armed 
conflicts. While the assertion that the law enforcement legal 
framework applies to all operations conducted against 
transnational non-state opponents is both illogical and overbroad, 
it would be equally illogical and overbroad to suggest all such 
operations are armed conflicts. What is necessary is to identify a 
logical and effective criterion to distinguish between non-conflict 
and armed conflict uses of military power in state efforts in the 
struggle against transnational terrorism. What this suggests is that 
contrary to the hyperbolic designation of a "Global War/' a much 
more precise conception of the military cornponent of this struggle 
is necessary. 
The most fundan1ental distinction between law enforcement 
and Mmed conflict is the nature and extent of the authority for the 
use deadly force. At the most basic level, law enforcement treats 
the use of deadly force as a measure of last resort. In contrast, 
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armed conflict is defined by the authority to use deadly force as a 
measure of first resort. This dichotomy provides the most logical 
de facto indication of armed conflict: armed conflict exists 
whenever a state employs armed force and grants that force the 
authority to use deadly force against an opponent as a measure of 
first resort. This is intuitive to military professionals increasingly 
competent in the full spectrum of operatior1s. They understand 
that patrolling the streets in Kosovo or Bosnia is not arn1ed confLict 
because their use of force authority is purely responsive. In 
contrast, whether engaging terrorist operatives in the mountains of 
Afghanistan, a base camp in Somalia, or the hills of southern 
Lebanon, it is the authority to engage an opponent with deadly 
combat power once that opponent is identified that defines such 
operations as armed conflict. 
Moving towards a broader conception of LOAC applicability is 
essential to ensure the fundamental purpose of the lavv is 
implemented: balancing authority and restraint during the 
conduct of armed hostilities. Denying the applicability of this law 
to situations involving the application of combat power implicitly 
based on the LOAC principle of military objective- a principle that 
permits the use of deadly force as a measure of first resort- results 
in a distortion of this balance. It also deprives the armed forces of 
the framework developed to guide their conduct in the n10st brutal 
environments, an outcome that is not only inconsistent with the 
general perception of what is "right" or "moral," but also with the 
preservation of disciplined and morally based armed forces. 
Like the military professionals who sowed the historic seeds of 
battlefield regulation that blossomed into the law of armed conflict, 
the drafters of the 1949 Geneva Conventions understood this, and 
in response they included articles in those treaties intended to 
prevent nullification of this regulatory framework based on politics 
and legal technicalities. But they could only respond to the legal 
deficiencies they had so painfully experienced, and in so doing 
created a law triggering paradigm that evolved to be restricted to 
that context. Although never fully responsive to the reality of 
contemporary military operations, the use of policy gap fillers 
negated the operational impact of the lacuna resulting from this 
restrictive interpretation. However, the selective invocation of 
authority without obligation that defined the Bush administration 
response to the terror attacks of September 11 exposed the limits of 
policy, and initiated a reconsideration of the limits of the law 
triggering paradigm. itself. Subsequent events in Lebanon a11.d 
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more recent ly in Gaza r(;'inforccd the imper.:1tive need to ensure 
that when a sta te invokes the au thori ty or the LOAC- namely the 
c:mthority to engage a n  opponent w i th dead ly combat power­
other pri nc iples must come into force to ensure this  hjstoric 
balance is presL·rvcd. 
The mi l it,lr�' component of the struggle against trc-msnational 
terrorism w i l l  ,1 lmost certainly continue to present complex 
challenges for uur nJtion. .:�nct other nations compelled to respond 
to this threat with armed force. B u t  such complexity is n o t  
unprecedented in the history o f  vVCirfare. Cond ucting military 
operations agninsl highly orgElnized non-state actors has been an 
aspect of tl1c Amcric;m w<�y of WC\r since tbe inception of the 
nation. What is  nevv is the suggestion that based on the 
transnRtioncl l  non-state m1Lme of the enemy these operations fall 
into a legc1l ''bl<�ck hole," permitti.n� states to selectively i n voke 
Lhose LOAC principles that serve their interests. Such a suggestion 
fundamentally undermi nes the bas ic "charter" of a professional 
armed force, crea tes a d angerous risk of encou raging the darkest 
instincts of those called upon to "deliver" results, and corrodes Lhe 
moral integrity nf the men and women w}lo serve this nation. Only 
a rejection of thi� proposition artd an endorsement of the obligation 
to comply with ,1 rrMncwork of bosic LO!\C principl es during al l  
armed conflicts \viii preserve the <�ppropriate balance between the 
dictates of necessity and the i n terests of hl.tnlanity. Such an 
outcome i s  more than logical. It is a fulfi l lment of the most 
significant advancement in lhe LOAC produced by the 194� 
Geneva Conventions: a categorical rejection of law avoidance. 
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